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UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
GEORGES ANDERSON NDERUBUMWE
RUTAGANDA V. THE PROSECUTOR, CASE
NO. ICTR-96-3-A
On May 26, 2003, the ICTR Appeals
Chamber rendered its judgement in Georges
Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. The
Prosecutor. In December 1999, Rutaganda was
found guilty by the Trial Chamber of participating in crimes committed during April to
June 1994 in the préfectures of Kigali and
Gitarama involving his distribution of
weapons to members of the Interahamwe, his
direction of men under his control to detain
and then kill ten Tutsis, his direction and participation in massacres at the École Technique
Officielle (ETO school) and the Nyanza gravel
pit, and his killing of Emmanuel Kayitare. For
these acts he was convicted of genocide and
crimes against humanity (murder and extermination) and sentenced by the Trial Chamber to
a single term of life imprisonment. Rutaganda
appealed against all his convictions and the
Prosecution appealed Rutaganda’s acquittal for
murder as a violation of common Article 3 to
the Geneva Conventions. The Appeals
Chamber set aside Rutaganda’s conviction for
murder as crime against humanity for the
killing of Emmanuel Kayitare, reversed his
acquittal for two counts of murder as violation
of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions, and affirmed the single sentence
of life imprisonment.
In discussing the standard for appellate
review, the Appeals Chamber affirmed that an
appeal was “not an opportunity for the parties
to reargue their case,” but must be based on
“an error on a question of law invalidating the
decision” or on “an error of fact that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.” Regarding an
error of law, the party raising the allegation
must identify the alleged error, present support
for the contention, and explain how the error
invalidates the decision. Regarding errors of
fact, the Appeals Chamber must show a high
level of deference to the Trial Chamber’s findings. Only when the Trial Chamber’s findings
of fact “could not have been accepted by any
reasonable person,” or when the evaluation of
the evidence is “wholly erroneous” may the
Appeals Chamber substitute its own findings.

When this requirement is met, the party arguing that there has been a miscarriage of justice
must further establish “that the error was critical to the verdict reached by the Trial
Chamber” and that “a grossly unfair outcome
has resulted from the error.”
The Appeals Chamber assessed and rejected Rutaganda’s contention that his right to a
fair trial was violated due to bias on the part of
the Trial Chamber in the treatment of his testimony and during the examination and crossexamination of witnesses. It also rejected
Rutaganda’s argument that the Trial Chamber
had erred in finding that, in accordance with
the test developed in the Akayesu Trial
Judgment, specific intent for genocide could
be inferred in part from the “general context of
the perpetration of acts by others.” In upholding the Akayesu approach, the Appeals
Chamber noted that it did “not imply that
guilt of an accused maybe inferred only from
his affiliation with a ‘guilty organision,’” but
required a determination of an accused’s intent
“on the analysis of his own acts and conduct”
at the time the crime was committed. It found
that the Trial Chamber had determined
Rutaganda’s specific intent on the basis of his
direct participation in specific crimes against
Tutsis and that this intent had been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.
Except in regard to Rutaganda’s responsibility for killing Emmanuel Kayitare, the Appeals Chamber determined that all of his allegations of errors of law and fact relating to the
assessment and treatment of evidence were unfounded. As to the Kayitare killing, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Trial Chamber’s
finding that the testimonies of two witnesses
were corroborative of each other as to the circumstances of the crime when they differed on
most material facts. Although corroboration of
witness testimony is not a requirement under
ICTR practice, the Appeals Chamber determined that, because it was required to “assess
the evidence presented at trial as an indivisible
whole” and could not substitute its own view
of the evidence for that of the Trial Chamber,
it “must enter a judgment of acquittal ‘if an appellant is able to establish that no reasonable
tribunal of fact could have reached a conclusion upon the evidence before it.’” Consequently, it overturned Rutaganda’s conviction
for murder as a crime against humanity.
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The Appeals Chamber then examined the
Prosecution’s contention that the Trial
Chamber had committed an error of fact by
failing to find a nexus between the crimes for
which Rutaganda was convicted and the armed
conflict. The Appeals Chamber adopted the
view of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Kunarac
Appeal Judgment that “if it can be established
. . . that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of
or under the guise of the armed conflict . . . it
would be sufficient to conclude that his acts
were closely related to the armed conflict.” It
explained that “‘under the guise of the armed
conflict’ does not mean simply ‘at the same
time as the armed conflict’ and/or ‘in any circumstances created in part by the armed conflict.’” Moreover, it emphasized that the finding of such a nexus will usually require consideration of more than one of the factors highlighted in Kunarac, including “the fact that the
perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the
victim is a non-combatant; the fact that the
victim is a member of the opposing party; the
fact that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the fact
that the crime is committed as part of or in the
context of the perpetrator’s official duties.”
Because the Trial Chamber had made factual
findings recognizing a link between the ETO
school and Nyanza massacres and the armed
conflict, and had determined that Rutaganda
had participated in these attacks, the Appeals
Chamber held that no reasonable trier of fact
would have failed to make the “inferential
leap” between Rutaganda’s acts and the armed
conflict. It therefore overturned Rutaganda’s
acquittal on two counts of violations of common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions.
The Appeals Chamber did not re-evaluate
the Trial Chamber’s sentence of life imprisonment due to its determination that the revision
of the verdict did not affect the overall gravity of
the crimes or the factual basis of the sentence.

PROSECUTOR V. ELIZAPHAN & GÉRARD
NTAKIRUTIMANA, CASE NOS. ICTR-9610, ICTR-96-17-T.
The Mugonero indictment addressed the
April 16th attack on Tutsis gathered in the
Mugonero Complex in Kibuye Préfecture.
The Complex was run by the Seventh Day
Adventist Association and contained a nursing
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school, a chapel, and a hospital, as well as
other office and residential buildings.
Elizaphan was a senior pastor at the Complex,
and Gérard worked as a doctor at the
Complex hospital. Most of the hundreds
killed during the attack were unarmed Tutsi
patients and civilians who had sought shelter
during the recent violence in the area. The
Bisesero indictment addressed numerous
attacks in the Bisesero area of Kibuye
Prefecture over a period of several months,
during which Interahamwe, gendarmes, soldiers, and civilians in convoys of vehicles
chased and shot at Tutsi refugees, killing hundreds. While chasing the refugees, many of
whom were survivors of the massacre at the
Mugonero Complex, the attackers sang,
“[e]xterminate them; look for them everywhere; kill them; and get it over with, in all
the forests.”
Regarding the charge of genocide, the Trial
Chamber noted that Elizaphan drove armed
attackers to the Complex and to areas in
Bisesero where Tutsis were believed to be hiding, pointed out refugees who were attempting
to flee, and encouraged the attackers to “kill”
and “exterminate” them. He also conveyed
attackers to the Murambi Church and ordered
them to remove the roof so that it could no
longer be used as a hiding-place for the Tutsis,
thus facilitating the work of the attackers in
hunting them down and killing them. The
Chamber considered “his position of authority
in the community” in finding that his actions
and presence at the scene of the attacks “constituted practical assistance and encouragement, which substantially contributed to the
commission of the crime of genocide by these
attackers,” thus meeting the elements for aiding and abetting. The totality of this behavior,
together with Elizaphan’s knowledge that
Tutsis were being targeted for attack, led the
Court to conclude that he had acted with the
specific intent to commit genocide. After finding Elizaphan guilty of aiding and abetting
genocide, the Chamber held that the alternative charge of complicity in genocide ceased to
apply without discussing the relationship
between these types of responsibility.
The Chamber found Gérard guilty of committing genocide based on his participation in
multiple attacks against Tutsi refugees, his
killing of three named Tutsis, and his procurement of ammunition and manpower for the
attack on the Complex. These actions, together with his leadership (on at least one occasion)
of attackers shooting at fleeing Tutsi refugees
during the Bisesero attacks, led the Chamber
to find that he had acted with genocidal intent.

The Chamber consequently found it unnecessary to consider the alternative charge of complicity in genocide.
In requiring the same level of intent for
both aiding and abetting genocide and committing genocide, the Trial Chamber applied a
higher standard for aiding and abetting than
that required by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals
Chamber in the subsequent Krnojelac case and
upheld by it again last year in Krstic. In Krstic,
the Appeals Chamber did not require that the
accused share the principal actor’s specific
intent to commit genocide to be found guilty
of aiding and abetting genocide. It found that
“an individual who aids and abets a specific
intent offense may be held responsible if he
assists the commission of the crime knowing
the intent behind the crime.” Because proof of
specific intent to aid and abet genocide would
likely imply knowledge that the principle perpetrators acted with the intent to commit
genocide, it does not appear that this jurisprudence would have impacted Elizaphan’s conviction on this charge.
Elizaphan and Gérard were also charged
with conspiring with each other and with
Charles Sikubwabo to commit genocide. The
Chamber found that Gérard attended meetings in which he participated in the planning
of attacks and distributed weapons, but there
was no evidence that Elizaphan or Charles
Sikubwabo were present during any of those
meetings. Since there was no proof that the
accused had an agreement to commit genocide, both Elizaphan and Gérard were found
not guilty of this charge. The Chamber noted
that to date the ICTR had convicted only one
person of conspiracy to commit genocide, following a guilty plea.
Elizaphan and Gérard were also both
charged with crimes against humanity for acts
of murder, extermination, and “other inhumane acts.” Although the Chamber had found
that there was a widespread and systematic
attack against the civilian Tutsi population at
the Mugonero Complex on April 16th and in
Bisesero from April to June 1994, it did not
find that Elizaphan had “aided an abetted in
the planning, preparation and execution of a
crime against humanity (murder).” Gérard was
found guilty of the crime against humanity of
murder for killing three people. The Chamber
found that he shot and killed Charles
Ukobizaba during the attack on the Mugonero
Complex, killed Esdras at a primary school,
and shot and killed the wife of Nzamwita at
Muyira Hill. Given the Chamber’s previous
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findings that Gérard participated in many
attacks, was associated with attackers, and procured munitions and other support for the
attackers, the Chamber found that he knew the
killings were part of a widespread and systematic attack.
Although the Trial Chamber had previously determined that “many hundreds” of people
died in the attacks, neither Elizaphan nor
Gérard was found guilty of the crime against
humanity of extermination. The Trial
Chamber cited the Vasiljevic judgment of the
ICTY for the proposition that even a “remote
or indirect” contribution would be sufficient
for a finding of responsibility for extermination. Nevertheless, because only three of the
individuals killed had been named or
described, it found “insufficient evidence as to
a large number of individuals killed as a result
of the Accused’s actions.” Comparatively, in its
subsequent Niyitegeka decision, the Trial
Chamber found the accused guilty of extermination because of “his participation in attacks
against Tutsi, and his acts of shooting at Tutsi
refugees . . ., and his killing of . . . three persons.” Notably, in neither decision were more
than three Tutsis killed during the attacks
“named or described.”
Elizaphan and Gérard were also found not
guilty of the crime against humanity of “other
inhumane acts.” The indictment charge
Gérard with inhumane acts for closing the
medical store, denying treatment to Tutsi
patients, and cutting off supplies at Mugonero
Complex. Elizaphan was charged with responsibility for Gérard’s acts “by virtue of his position as head of the Complex.” The Trial
Chamber found, however, that the Prosecution
had not proved that any of these alleged acts
had taken place. Elizaphan and Gérard were
also charged with inhumane acts for the
removal of the roof of the Murambi Church at
Bisesero, which had deprived the refugees of a
place to hide. The Chamber found that
Gérard did not have sufficient notice that he
was charged with removing the church roof.
While Elizaphan had conveyed attackers to
Murambi Church and ordered them to
remove the roof, thus facilitating “the hunting
down and killing of the refugees,” the Trial
Chamber held that it had not been proved
that this act “resulted in serious physical or
mental suffering, or amounted to a serious
attack on human dignity, of the refugees.”
The Chamber was also not satisfied that this
act met the threshold requirement for this category of crimes that it be “of similar seriousness to other enumerated acts in the Article.”
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Gérard was charged with individual criminal responsibility as a superior for genocide,
complicity in genocide, and the crimes against
humanity of murder, extermination, and other
inhumane acts. The Chamber found some evidence that Gérard had taken charge of
Mugonero Hospital during the time of the
attack, and that he played a prominent role
during some of the attacks on Tutsis at
Bisesero. Nevertheless, it found that the
Prosecution had failed to prove that Gérard
had “effective control” over anyone participating in the attacks.
Under the Bisesero indictment, both
Elizaphan and Gérard were charged with violations of common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II for
committing “violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being, in particular murder
and cruel treatment of persons not taking an
active part in hostilities.” The Chamber stated
that the ICTR had never found anyone guilty
under this charge and cited the ICTY’s
Vasiljevic Trial Judgment for the proposition
that because “customary international law does
not provide a sufficiently precise definition of
a crime under this provision,” it violates the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime
without law). The provision addressed by the
Vasiljevic holding is not identical to the one at
issue in this case, however. Additionally, that
holding referred only to the charge of “violence
to life and person” as a violation of the laws
and customs of war. The offence of murder as
a violation of the laws and customs of war was
charged as a separate offence and found by the
Vasiljevic Chamber to be “a well-defined crime
under customary international law.” Notably,
the provision under which Elizaphan and
Gérard were charged explicitly addressed violence that amounted “in particular” to murder
and cruel treatment. The Ntakirutimana Trial
Chamber, however, offered no additional reasons for finding a lack of clarity in the definition of the crime with which they were
charged. Nonetheless, the Chamber was also
not satisfied that all elements of the offence,
including proof of the existence of a nexus
between the alleged acts and the armed conflict, had been met.
At sentencing, the Chamber noted as mitigating circumstances that Elizaphan was 78
years old, was in poor health, and “was essentially a person of good moral character until
the events of April to July of 1994 during
which he was swept along with many
Rwandans into criminal conduct.” The
Chamber, however, considered these same factors to be aggravating circumstances. Because

many of those killed in the attacks were his
own parishioners who had specifically sought
his assistance in the hope that his intervention
could save their lives, Elizaphan was deemed to
have abused the trust placed in him as a leader
in the community. Nevertheless, the Chamber
sentenced him to imprisonment for ten years.
In considering the mitigating circumstances in
Gérard’s case, the Chamber noted that he
assisted a number of Tutsi women and children
during April 1994. However, the Chamber
found it “particularly egregious that, as a medical doctor, he took lives instead of saving
them.” The Chamber also took into consideration the fact that his crimes were committed
with zeal, and that he attacked civilians even in
the hospital in which he worked. Determining
that the aggravating factors outweighed those
in mitigation, the Chamber sentenced Gérard
to imprisonment for 25 years.

THE PROSECUTOR V. JUVENAL KAJELIJELI,
CASE NO. ICTR-98-44A-T
On December 1, 2003, ICTR Trial
Chamber II rendered its judgment and sentence in The Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli.
Charges against Kajelijeli were based on his
responsibility for attacks against Tutsis of the
Mukingo, Nkuli, and Kigombe communes
during April 1994. The Trial Chamber found
Kajelijeli guilty of genocide, direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, and extermination as a crime against humanity. It found
him not guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide and crimes against humanity (rape and
“other inhumane acts”), and dismissed the
charges of complicity in genocide and crimes
against humanity (murder and persecution).
He was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment and one term of 15 years to be served
concurrently.
As a former bourgmestre of Mukingo commune, Kajelijeli had considerable influence in
his community, which he used to act “as a
bridge between the military and the civilian
spheres in an effort to attack and massacre the
civilian Tutsi population.” The Trial Chamber
found that he had effective control over the
Interahamwe paramilitary forces in both
Mukingo and Nkuli communes during the
period when the attacks that formed the basis
of the charges against him took place.
Following the death of the President of Rwanda
on April 6th, 1994, he had arranged for the
Interahamwe to receive weapons and played a
significant role in directing, organizing, and
facilitating their participation in numerous
attacks against Tutsis. For example, he assembled members of the Interahamwe at a market
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on April 7th and instructed them to “exterminate the Tutsis.” Moreover, he commanded and
supervised such attacks. The Trial Chamber
found that his words and deeds clearly showed
that he directed and participated in the killing
of Tutsis with the specific intent to destroy
them as a group. As a result, it found Kajelijeli
responsible under both Article 6(1) of the
ICTR Statute for instigating, ordering, and aiding and abetting genocide and under Article
6(3) for the genocidal acts of his subordinates.
The Trial Chamber dismissed the charge of
complicity in genocide without elaboration
after finding that it was an alternative count
arising out of the same factual allegations.
Despite Kajelijeli’s attendance at numerous
meetings prior to 1994 during which the setting up of militia groups to fight the Rwandese
Patriotic Front (RPF) and their accomplices
was discussed, his influence over the local
Interahamwe from January-July 1994, his
active participation in training the
Interahamwe prior to April 6, 1994, and his
leadership of a meeting on April 6th during
which the killing of Tutsi was orchestrated, the
Trial Chamber determined that there was
insufficient evidence that Kajelijeli was
involved in a conspiracy “from late 1990
through about July 1994” to exterminate
Tutsis. It found the evidence inconclusive as to
whether or not the extermination of Tutsis had
been discussed at the meetings Kajelijeli
attended prior to April 6th and as to whether
the list of Tutsi names he had drawn up prior
to 1992 was for the purpose of identifying
those to be eliminated. Moreover, it found no
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
training of the Interahamwe had a genocidal
purpose prior to April 6, 1994. As a result, the
Chamber found him not guilty of conspiracy
to commit genocide.
Because Kajelijeli provoked a crowd assembled at a market, including members of the
Interahamwe, to kill and exterminate Tutsis,
the Trial Chamber found him guilty of direct
and public incitement to genocide. It agreed
with the Akayesu Trial Judgment that an inciter
must have the specific intent to commit genocide, which it had already determined Kajelijeli
to possess. Because the Trial Chamber did not
find that Kajelijeli’s subordinates themselves
incited genocide, he was not found guilty of
superior responsibility for this crime.
Kajelijeli was also charged with murder,
extermination, rape, persecution, and “other
inhumane acts” as crimes against humanity
based on a widespread attack against the civilian Tutsi ethnic group in Mkingo, Nkuli, and
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Kigombe communes. As a result of insufficient
evidence, the Prosecution withdrew and the
Trial Chamber dismissed the charge of persecution as a crime against humanity. The Trial
Chamber also dismissed the charge of murder
as a crime against humanity after finding that
“there was insufficient distinction drawn in the
Indictment between the general allegations of
murder as a crime against humanity and extermination as a crime against humanity.”
Because the indictment did not specifically
identify the victims whom Kajelijeli had been
charged with killing, the Chamber decided it
was more appropriate for it to consider evidence of individual killings as “examples of the
general targeting of populations or groups of
people for purposes of extermination, rather
than murder specifically.” It then found
Kajelijeli guilty of extermination both individually and as a superior for knowingly participating, commanding, and ordering attacks
against whole neighborhoods and places of
refuge during which nearly the entire Tutsi
populations of Mukingo, Nkuli, and Kigombe
communes had been eliminated.
On the charge of rape as a crime against
humanity, the Trial Chamber held that the
Prosecutor had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kajelijeli had “planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted the planning, preparation or
execution of the rapes which the Chamber
found to have occurred.” Instead his instructions were, “in general, to kill or to exterminate.” Despite the testimony of several victims,
the Trial Chamber found reasonable doubt as
to his presence at any of the rapes.
Furthermore, although the Chamber determined that numerous rapes were committed
by Interahamwe under his control, it found it
impossible to infer that Kajelijeli either knew
or had reason to know that the rapes were
being committed. Judge Ramaroson dissented
based on what she considered to be credible
witness testimony placing him at the scene of a
rape, overhearing him order rape, and claiming
he asked for a woman to be delivered to him
after he finished drinking at a bar. Ramaroson
also took into account testimony that placed
Kajelijeli’s at the scene of an attack when
Interahamwe announced to survivors that they
would be raped and have bottles placed in their
genitals. She argued that whether or not
Kajelijeli heard this statement, it demonstrated
the atmosphere at the scene and that the
Interahamwe ordered to kill by Kajelijeli also
intended to rape. Moreover, his knowledge of
the rapes was demonstrated by his participation in attacks during which rapes took place

and the fact that his subordinates reported
back to him each day on their activities. For
these reasons, she would have found him personally responsible for rape.
The Trial Chamber likewise held that the
Prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Kajelijeli’s individual responsibility for, presence during, or knowledge of
“other inhumane acts” as a crime against
humanity committed by members of
Interahamwe under his control. The Chamber
noted that inhumane acts must be similar in
gravity to the other enumerated acts of crimes
against humanity under the ICTR Statute and
must “deliberately cause suffering.” Moreover,
the Prosecution must prove a nexus between
the inhumane act and the suffering or serious
injury to the mental or physical health of the
victim. The Trial Chamber found that gross
acts of sexual mutilation by the Interahamwe of
women of Tutsi ethnicity, including the piercing of a dead rape victim’s side and sexual
organs with a spear, constituted a serious attack
on the human dignity of the Tutsi community
as a whole. The Chamber, however, found no
evidence that Kajelijeli had been present during such acts. Moreover, the Chamber said that
it could not infer from either the evidence or
the circumstances that Kajelijeli knew or had
reason to know that the Interahamwe were
committing such crimes.

RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS:
PROSECUTOR V. ISSA HASSAN SESAY,
MORRIS KALLON, AND AUGUSTINE
GBAO
ON JANUARY 19, 2005, THE TRIAL CHAMBER
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (Special
Court) issued its ruling on the Issue of the
Refusal of the Accused Sesay and Kallon to Appear
for their Trial, in the case of Prosecutor v. Issa
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine
Gbao. The three defendants are alleged to be
part of the original five leaders of the former
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), whom the
Special Court indicted for war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and other serious violations
of international humanitarian law. The Special
Court withdrew the indictments of the other
two alleged leaders, Foday Sankoh and Sam
Bockarie, after their deaths. The Special Court
issued indictments for Issa Hassan Sesay and
Morris Kallon on March 7, 2003, and
Augustine Gbao on April 16, 2003. The Trial
Chamber ordered the joint trial of the three
men and on February 5, 2004, prosecutors
issued a consolidated indictment. The RUF
trial began on July 5, 2004.
36

The Third Trial Session started on January
11, 2005, at which time Sesay’s counsel indicated that his client wished to make a statement to the Judges. The Judges were wary of a
potential obstruction of the proceedings, but
allowed Sesay to make the statement. In his
statement, Sesay referred to the amnesty provisions in the Lomé Peace Accords, questioning
the legality of the charges against him. The
Judges found this impermissible and asked him
to cease. When Sesay refused to desist from
making his statement, Judge Thompson
ordered him removed from the court. Sesay
maintained that if he was not able to make his
statement, he would not attend proceedings.
Sesay and Kallon then both submitted written
statements as evidence, after which neither
returned to the courtroom with their attorneys
for further proceedings.
This case raised the issue of whether defendants in the Special Court may be tried despite
their refusal to attend their hearings. Article
17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court
states that each accused has the right “to be
tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her choosing.” The Trial
Chamber interpreted this provision to obligate
a court to try an accused in his or her presence.
In doing so, the Trial Chamber cited Rule 60
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
Special Court, which states that an accused
may be tried in his absence in only two specific instances: (1) where an accused has made an
initial appearance and has been afforded the
right to appear at trial but refuses to do so or
(2) where, having made an initial appearance,
the accused is at large and refuses to appear in
court. Rule 60 also states that, in either case,
the accused may be represented by counsel of
his choice and that the matter may proceed if
the Judge or Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
accused has waived his right to be present.
In its July 13, 2004, ruling on the third
defendant, Augustine Gbao, who refused to
appear in court earlier that month, the Trial
Chamber allowed the trial to continue without
Gbao’s presence but stated that an accused person should only be tried in his or her absence
in very exceptional circumstances. The Trial
Chamber balanced the need for defendants to
be present at their trials with the potential
obstruction of justice that would result if trials
were delayed due to a defendant’s refusal to
appear. The court stated, “an accused person
charged with serious crimes who refuses to
appear in court should not be permitted to
obstruct the judicial machinery by preventing
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the commencement or continuation of trials
by deliberately being absent.” In light of the
fact that the accused were represented by counsel and had made initial appearances before the
court, the Trial Chamber concluded that they
had waived their rights to be present at their
trials. Thus, all three of the living defendants
were found to have waived their right to be
present at trial.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMES IN
DARFUR
ON FEBRUARY 1, 2005, A REPORT by a UNappointed Commission of Inquiry into international crimes in Darfur, Sudan, released its
findings to the public. Among other responsibilities, the five-person Commission was
charged with determining whether genocide
was occurring in Sudan’s Darfur region. The
Commission concluded that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed militia were responsible for serious violations of international
law and strongly recommended that the Security Council refer the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Nevertheless, after finding that “the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing,” the Commission concluded that the Government of the
Sudan “has not pursued a policy of genocide.”
Because Sudan is not a party to the Rome
Statute of the ICC, a Security Council referral
is required for the court to have jurisdiction
over the crimes committed in Darfur.
In its report, the Commission of Inquiry
emphasized that, although the government was
not pursuing a genocidal policy, this should
not detract from the gravity of the crimes perpetrated. The Commission found that
Sudanese government forces and militia “conducted indiscriminate attacks, including
killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other
forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced
displacement.” The Commission also found
substantial evidence that rebel forces were
responsible for war crimes, including murder
of civilians and pillage. Since Sudanese rebels
took up arms in 2003, tens of thousands of
people have been killed and up to 1.85 million
others are internally displaced or are now
refugees in neighboring Chad.
Although the Commission did not find
genocidal intent, it determined that the attacks
were launched for counter-insurgency purposes and were “deliberately and indiscriminately
directed against civilians.” Even when attacks

were directed at rebels, the use of force was disproportionate to the threat posed. The
Commission recommended that the matter be
referred to the ICC because it found that the
Sudanese government would not be able to
adequately address the problem. The
Commission stated that “the measures taken so
far by the Sudanese government to address the
crisis have been both grossly inadequate and
ineffective, which has contributed to the climate of almost total impunity for human
rights violations in Darfur.” The Commission
went on to say that “very few victims have
lodged official complaints regarding crimes
committed against them or their families, due
to a lack of confidence in the justice system.”
Additionally, the Commission recommended the establishment of a reparations system for the victims of the crimes, whether or
not perpetrators have been identified. The
Commission also gave Secretary-General Kofi
Annan a sealed file of names of persons
believed to be responsible for the crimes. This
list would eventually be given to the ICC prosecutor if the situation is referred. Annan stated
that although his support for the ICC was well
known, a potential referral to the ICC was a
decision for the Security Council.
A Security Council referral on the situation
in Darfur to the ICC is quite controversial.
The United States, in the face of strong
European opposition, is heavily lobbying the
Security Council to avoid referring the matter
to the ICC, a campaign that reflects the Bush
administration’s stance against the tribunal.
The Bush administration fears the ICC may
bring frivolous prosecutions against American
soldiers and civilians abroad. In addition to the
Secretary General’s vocal support, a majority of
the 15 members of the Security Council is
known to favor referring the matter to the
ICC. This poses a dilemma for the United
States, which has demanded accountability
and sanctions against the Sudanese authorities,
but which also opposes the ICC.
The proposed alternative, as suggested by
Pierre-Richard Prosper, the United States
Ambassador-at-Large for war crimes, is to refer
the Darfur charges to a new African war crimes
tribunal to be based at the headquarters of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in
Arusha, Tanzania. The UN and the African
Union would jointly administer this new
court. Both the Commission of Inquiry and
human rights groups have expressed concerns,
however, that this alternative would be exces-
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sively costly and time-consuming. With no set
time frame to make a decision, it seems that
the international community’s ideological fight
over how to bring justice to the victims in
Darfur is simply adding to the inconceivable
injustices they have already suffered.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
ON JANUARY 7, 2005, PRESIDENT BOZIZÉ of
the Central African Republic (CAR) submitted
a referral to the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes committed
on CAR territory since July 1, 2002, when the
Rome Statute came into force. Intervention by
the ICC may prove unnecessary, however, if
the CAR implements internal changes to
address these crimes. Regardless of whether the
ICC prosecutes these crimes, measures must
still be taken to stop the on-going violence and
to prevent further human rights violations in
the CAR. As it stands, on January 20, 2005,
ICC President Phillippe Kirsch (Canada)
assigned the situation to Pre-Trial Chamber
III, over which judges Hans-Peter Kaul
(Germany), Tuiloma Neroni Slade (Samoa),
and Sylvia Steiner (Brazil) preside.
Since 2000, the UN has promoted a peaceful transition in the CAR through its Peacebuilding Office (BONUCA) to help the
nation recover from decades of armed conflict.
The Central African Republic broke from
French colonial rule in 1960 when David
Dacko, its brutal dictator, rose to power. JeanBédel Bokassa then overthrew Dacko and
ruled the CAR until a French-initiated coup in
1979 restored Dacko to power. The country
underwent a series of violent coups from 1981
to 2003, the most recent of which saw the
overthrow of President Ange Félix Patassé by
the current President François Bozizé, but officially became a democracy in 1993. An ICC
referral would address the wide range of crimes
committed in the Central African Republic
since July 1, 2002.
Despite recent progress, controversy
surrounds the March 2005 elections in the
CAR, renewing the threat of instability. On
December 30, 2004, the Transitional Constitutional Court disqualified 10 out of the 15 presidential candidates for failing to deposit the
required $10,000, failing to own property
within their constituencies, submitting fraudulent documents to the electoral commission,
misappropriating public funds, or committing
human rights violations. The court specifically
denied candidacy to former president Ange
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Félix Patassé, members of his cabinet, and
members of his political party, the Mouvement
de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain. President
Bozizé attempted to overturn the court’s
decision by authorizing additional candidates
pursuant to Article 22 of the CAR’s new
Constitution, which allows the president to
ensure “the regular functioning of the public
powers and continuity - of the state.” The court
denies Bozizé’s authority to overrule it.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s latest
report on the situation emphasized the importance of consensus and legitimacy in the CAR’s
democratic process. Annan praised the referenda establishing the new transitional constitution (December 5, 2004) and the draft electoral code that was voted on in February 2005.
Security Council President César Mayoral
(Argentina) recently voiced his confidence in
the CAR’s movement toward constitutional
legitimacy and the rule of law.
In line with this optimism, ICC Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo may opt against a formal
ICC investigation. The Prosecutor must first
determine whether the CAR satisfies the criteria set forth in the Rome Statute. Specifically,
he must assess the existence of national proceedings in the CAR, the gravity of alleged
offenses, and the interests of justice. The ICC
is a court of last resort, aiming to complement,
rather than supplant, national systems. If the
Prosecutor determines that the CAR is already
undertaking a credible investigation of the
alleged crimes, the ICC may defer to the
national legal system.
An ICC investigation may be viewed as
problematic because the court cannot investigate crimes that occurred prior to the Rome
Statute’s inception in July 2002. Human rights
advocates support a long-term action plan that
would punish all grievous violations, regardless
of when they occurred and regardless of the
suspect’s nationality. This plan would require
the CAR to implement legislation that incorporates into national law those crimes already
codified in the Rome Statute and other international human rights treaties.
The CAR now has an opportunity to
demonstrate its commitment to addressing
the atrocities that accompanied years of
political instability. Regardless of whether the
ICC prosecutes these crimes, human rights
groups implore the CAR government to take
action to prevent further attacks against civilians by the Bozizé government and Patassé’s
opposition forces.

EAST TIMOR
ON DECEMBER 23, 2004, INDONESIA AND
EAST TIMOR agreed to establish a Truth and

East Timor are expected to finalize the Truth
and Friendship Commission’s framework and
implementing mechanism in early 2005.

Friendship Commission to investigate human
rights abuses and address the 1,500 murders
committed in the aftermath of the 1999 East
Timorese referendum on independence from
Indonesia. The announcement came on the
heels of increased international advocacy for an
independent and impartial commission to
review the work of the ad hoc human rights tribunal in Jakarta and the Special Panels for
Serious Crimes in East Timor. The United
States proposes that this Truth and Friendship
Commission coordinate its investigation with
a UN-backed Commission of Experts.

Although the Truth and Friendship
Commission is modeled after established Truth
and Reconciliation Commissions such as that
in South Africa, it has been criticized for focusing more on strengthening the economic
friendship between East Timor and Indonesia
than on combating impunity. In a statement to
Kofi Annan, the International Federation for
East Timor, an organization which promotes
human rights in East Timor, contends that the
Truth and Friendship Commission would only
advance the status quo because “a bi-national
commission will just be another mechanism
for Indonesia to bully its smaller, weaker
neighbor.” Timorese rights activists, moreover,
question the strength of this commission, fearing that it will deny justice to victims and their
families because it focuses on lower offences,
lacks authority to punish crimes, and stresses
forgiveness. Many victims are concerned that
they will be forced to forgive the perpetrators
and will be denied the opportunity to prosecute
them. At the same time, East Timor must consider the reasons for moving forward with the
establishment of the Truth and Friendship
Commission, as it depends on a sound relationship with Indonesia for a vast majority of its
imports and for its border security. The mechanism by which the Truth and Friendship
Commission will facilitate the telling of peoHRB
ples’ stories remains unclear.

In 2000, Indonesia established an ad hoc
tribunal in Jakarta to prosecute police and military officers who participated in the murders
and forced relocation of 275,000 people in
East Timor during Indonesian control. While
the ad hoc court has convicted six out of 18
suspects, it eventually reversed five convictions
on appeal, with an appeal of the sixth still
pending. This situation has raised doubts
about the court’s effectiveness and impartiality.
The UN-supported Special Panels for Serious
Crimes in Dili, in comparison, have indicted
almost 400 people and convicted 72 lower
level offenders. Most of the senior officers
responsible for human rights violations have
sought refuge behind a shield of impunity in
Indonesia, however. Both tribunals have so far
failed to meet the objectives of UN Security
Council Resolution 1272, which calls for “all
those responsible for such violence [to] be
brought to justice.”
As a result of international pressure, the
UN created a Commission of Experts to investigate the impartiality and independence of
prosecutions in the ad hoc court in Jakarta and
the effectiveness of Special Panels for Serious
Crimes in Dili. The three experts named in
February 2005 are Justice Prafullachandra
Bhagwati of India, Professor Yozo Yokota of
Japan, and Shaista Shameem of Fiji. The
establishment of the Commission of Experts
has been well received by human rights advocates. Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda,
however, is promoting the Truth and
Friendship Commission as an alternative.
Both Wirajuda and East Timorese Foreign
Minister Jose Ramos Horta agree that implementing both commissions would be redundant, and they tout the Truth and Friendship
Commission as an opportunity to bring a resolution to the 1999 atrocities. Indonesia and
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